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FINANCE, DEBT, AND TAXATION
THE FINANCIAL, DEBT, AND TAXATION PROVISIONS
OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTION
CHARLTON F. CHUTEt AND VICTOR D. BRANNONtt
In many respects the provisions of the Missouri Constitution
of 1875 relating to financial, debt, and taxation matters were
among the most novel features of that document. Some of them
were not only unique so far as the constitutional history of Mis-
souri was concerned, but they were in the vanguard of a nation-
wide movement that was to affect the constitutions of many
states in the years to come.
It is clear from contemporary documents that the framers of
the Constitution of 1875 devised these provisions, and recom-
mended them to the electorate for adoption, confident in the belief
that a solution had been found to the pronounced trend of gov-
ernment expenditures to mount ever higher. In view, therefore,
of the problems we face today in connection with taxation and
governmental spending, it is fitting that we re-examine the mo-
tives and objectives of the framers of these provisions, analyze
the more important devices they wrote into the constitution, and
determine the extent to which they have been justified in view
of our experience with them in the past 67 years. We should be
merely a negative critic if we did not add some comments indic-
ative of the best current thought of specialists in this field.
It has been generally agreed by those who have studied the
Missouri Constitution of 1875 that it was, to quote a leading
writer on the subject, "a conservative constitution containing
stringent restrictions on public taxation, bonded indebtedness,
and state and local expenditures."'
In the earlier constitutions, those of 1820 and 1865, there were
few provisions relating directly to public finance, and these were
not deemed of sufficient importance by the framers to warrant
a separate article. The appearance of so many financial provi-
sions in the Constitution of 1875 attests the importance of this
subject in the minds of the delegates to the convention.
t Director, Governmental Research Institute, St. Louis.
ft Member of the staff, Governmental Research Institute, St. Louis.
1. 1 Loeb and Shoemaker, Journal Missouri Constitutionl Convention of
1875 (1920) 71.
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These provisions appear to have been caused by a considerable
demand for a more conservative constitution because of the state
legislature's abuse of the power of special legislation, and its
policy of encouraging the creation of public debt to provide aid
for the railroads. The Civil War brought both new taxes and
higher tax rates.2 "The members of the Constitutional Conven-
tion had personal experience with these conditions and their con-
stituents were demanding relief and safeguards for the future.
As a result the Constitution of 1875 was distinguished for pos-
sessing greater restrictions upon legislative power than any of
its contemporaries in other states and today there are few state
constitutions which can compare with the strictness of its pro-
visions."3
That the members of the constitutional convention of 1875
consciously labored to meet this demand is well indicated from
the emphasis placed on conservative public finance in the follow-
ing summary paragraph which appears in their Address To Ac-
company The Constitution:
It will be seen that the end sought to be accomplished
is to secure an efficient and economical administration of
the several departments of the state government; and with
this object in view, especial effort has been directed to se-
cure the following results: restriction upon the powers of
the legislative department; uniformity in the organization
and jurisdiction of the Judicial Department; limitations
upon the power of all officials in the creation of debts; reduc-
tion of taxes of the State and of all counties, townships,
cities, towns, and school districts; the removal of opportu-
nity for private use of public moneys and a rigid economy
in the expenditure thereof and prevention of abuse of power
and corruption in office.4
The more important fiscal provisions which are the subject of
this article may be classified for convenience as follows: (1) Tax
limit provisions, (2) The general property tax, (3) Debt limit
provisions, (4) Powers and procedures of state finance officers,
(5) Miscellaneous financial provisions.
2. Judson, A Treatise upon the Law and Practice of Taxation in Missouri
(1900) 34.
3. 1 Loeb and Shoemaker, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 28.
4. 2 Loeb and Shoemaker, Journal Missouri Constitutional Convention of
1875 (1920) 883.
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1. TAx LIMIT PROVISIONS
Let us examine first the devices by which it was hoped the
constitution would promote the "reduction of taxes of the state
and of all counties, townships, cities, towns, and school districts."
Undoubtedly the most important device was that of setting
a constitutional limit to the rate of the general property tax for
each class of governmental unit. This was a new device for
Missouri, for, as the framers pointed out, "At present there is
no such Constitutional limit.', 5
Moreover, Missouri would appear to have been among the
first in the matter of setting constitutional limits to general
property tax rates, for it is reported that there were none prior
to the Civil War. "During the seventies and eighties, however,
they appear with increasing frequency, and by the end of the
century eighteen states had such restrictions." 6 It was recently
reported that, at present, about 38 states have some sort of tax
limit provisions. About 20 of these have tax limit provisions
written into their constitutions.?
The particular type of tax limit employed in Missouri is the
specific limit on the tax rate for each of the several layers of
governmental units. In the case of the state government, the
constitution clearly specifies that the tax limit provided is "ex-
clusive of the tax necessary to pay the bonded debt of the State.""
The framers did not, however, express themselves so clearly as
to whether the tax limits for local governments provided in
article X, section 11 applied only to taxes for operating purposes,
or whether they also covered taxes levied to service indebtedness
incurred under section 12. This question troubled the courts for
many years.9 In the case of Lamar Water Company v. City of
Lamar,0 decided in 1895, the Missouri Supreme Court held that
the limits in article X, section 11 apply only to local taxes for
general operating purposes, and that additional taxes can be
levied to pay debts incurred under section 12. This interpreta-
tion was reaffirmed in later cases decided by the court.-
5. Id. at 881.
6. Newcomer, "The Growth of Tax Limitation Legislation," in Public
Administration Service, Property Tax Limitation Laws (Rev. ed. 1936) 38.
7. Groves, Financing Government (1939) 461.
8. Mo. Const (1875) art. X, §8.
9. Skinker, Constitutional Limitations on Municipal Taxation in Missouri
(1921) 6 ST. Louis LAw Ruvrmw 61.
10. (1895) 128 Mo. 188, 26 S. W. 1025.
11. Aurora Water Co. v. City of Aurora (1895) 129 Mo. 540, 81 S. W.
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First of all comes the limitation on the rate of the general
property tax for the support of the state government itself. The
constitution (article X, section 8) provides that this rate shall
not exceed 20c on the $100 valuation, and shall be reduced to 15c
whenever the taxable property of the state exceeds 900 million
dollars. It is evident from this that the framers took into con-
sideration the two variables that determine the amount of a tax
levy, i. e. the valuation and the tax rate. They lived in a growing
commonwealth, and although the taxable valuation for state pur-
poses was but $596,529,955 in 1875, they looked forward in con-
fidence to the day when the state's taxable valuation should ex-
ceed 900 million dollars. It did not seem wise to them to permit
the state's tax rate limit to remain unchanged regardless of the
increase in the tax base. It is not hard to understand their, belief
that the state's power to raise revenue should increase in some-
thing less than direct proportion to the increase in the taxable
wealth. So it happened that when the state's assessed valuation
exceeded 900 million dollars in 1892 and the 15c rate automati-
cally went into effect, the levy amounted to $387,759 less than it
had the year before. 2 To this extent then, the hope of the fram-
ers to reduce state taxes'3 had been fulfilled; the state tax rate
limit was automatically reduced from 20c to 15c. During the
seventeen year period, 1875 to 1892, however, the levy rose from
$1,185,316 to $1,367,687.
What would the framers think if they could compare the state's
taxes today with the ones they knew in 1875? The state auditor's
report of that day shows that 98% of the state's revenue re-
ceipts came from the general property tax, the remainder con-
sisting of fees, earnings, grants, and donations. For the bien-
nium 1873-74 it is reported that state receipts from general prop-
erty taxes amounted to $5,752,529. When this is compared with
the state's receipts of $142,169,502 from taxes alone in the most
recently completed biennium, 1939-40, it will be seen that there
has been an increase of 2,371% over the state's tax receipts in
1873-74. This almost astronomical increase has come, not from
946; Lamar Water Co. v. City of Lamar (1897) 140 Mo. 145, 39 S. W. 768;
City of Stanberry v. Jordan (1898) 145 Mo. 371, 46 S. W. 1093; State ex
Tel. Miller v. M. K. & T. R. R. (1901) 164 Mo. 208, 64 S. W. 187; City of
Lexington v. Lafayette County Bank (1901) 165 Mo. 671, 65 S. W. 943.
12. Report of the State Auditor of Missouri (1891-92) 21.
13. 2 Loeb and Shoemaker, op. cit. supra, note 4, at 880.
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any revision upward of the limit on the property tax rate for
state purposes, but rather from the introduction of new taxes
such as the state inheritance tax, the income tax, the retail sales
tax, the gasoline tax, beer and liquor taxes, business license taxes,
and taxes on non-business licenses, such as those issued for auto-
mobiles, drivers, and fishermen and hunters. The conclusion is
inescapable that, despite the limit on the general property tax,
the tax burden for state government on Missourians has in-
creased more than 23 times since our state constitution was
adopted.
Now let us examine the constitutional limitations on the gen-
eral property tax rate for local governments. Here the framers
recognized a fundamental truth in public finance, namely, that
communities vary in their need for public services and also in
their ability and willingness to pay for what they need. In other
words, tax limits should have some flexibility so as to control a
community without putting it in a plaster cast. It will be seen
from the following discussion that the degree of flexibility pro-
vided by the constitution varies with the type of local govern-
ment.
The device written into the constitution by the framers to
adjust the county tax rate limit to the community's need pro-
ceeded on at least one assumption, namely, that need varied with
a county's taxable wealth. This assumption is, of course, open
to question.
Article X, section 11 of the constitution provides the following
limits on the general property tax for county purposes:
In counties having an assessed valuation of 6 mil-
lion dollars or less ........................................ 50c on the $100
In counties having between 6 and 10 million dol-
lars .-------------------- ---------------------------------- " -- -- -- " "
In counties having between 10 and 30 million dol-
lars ---------------- ...-- -- ..................------------------------------ 50 "
In counties having an assessed valuation of 30
m illion dollars or m ore ........ . ...................---- - 35 " " "
The state auditor's report for 1873-74 gives the taxable wealth
of the counties of Missouri for the year 1873, the last year for
which complete data were available in 1875. Analysis of this
data shows that 100 counties had an assessed valuation of less
than 6 million dollars, 11 counties fell in the bracket 6 to 10
1942]
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million, 2 counties fell in the bracket 10 to 30 million, and only
St. Louis County, which then included the City of St. Louis, had
more than 30 million dollars of assessed valuation.
The contrast with the situation today is striking. The Journal
of the State Board of Equalization gives the 1939 assessment for
1940 taxes, and shows that only 20 Missouri counties now have
an assessed valuation of less than 6 million dollars, 17 counties
fall in the 6 to 10 million bracket, 67 counties fall in the 10 to
30 million bracket, and 11 counties now have an assessed valua-
tion of over 30 million dollars. The assessed valuation of the
state rose from $640,381,402 in 1873 to $3,825,630,975 in 1939.
It will be observed that while in general the limit on the tax
rate is reduced as the county's assessed valuation increases, a
departure from this logic is made for counties having an as-
sessed valuation of between 10 and 30 million dollars. The reason
for this is not fully clear at this time. The Journal of the 1875
convention shows that the convention's Committee on Revenue
and Taxation recommended rates that progressively declined as
the county's assessed valuation increased.", These rates were,
however, amended on the floor of the convention. The rate limit
for counties having an assessed valuation of between 10 to 30
million dollars was seemingly raised to 50c by an amendment
offered by Mr. Chrisman of Jackson County on July 15, 1875.
The debates for this day of the convention's proceedings have not
yet been published. It is interesting to note that Mr. Chrisman's
amendment probably was motivated by the fact that the assessed
valuation of Jackson County at that time caused it to fall within
the bracket of 10 to 30 million dollars.
The attempt to introduce a measure of flexibility by varying
the limit for the county rate, as the assessed valuation of the
county rose, was doomed to failure. It was not sufficiently flex-
ible to meet needs three and four decades later. The framers of
1875 could not foresee the coming of the automobile and the popu-
larity it was to enjoy. In 1907 the legislature proposed an amend-
ment to the constitution authorizing a county to levy, in addition
to the county tax mentioned above, a special tax of not to exceed
25c on the $100 valuation to be used for road and bridge pur-
poses only. This amendment was ratified at the election of No-
14. Id. at 536.
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vember 3, 1908, and the county tax limit for a county having
less than 6 million dollars was thereby raised from 50c to 75c
on the $100.
The end was not yet in sight. Twelve years later the constitu-
tion was again amended to authorize the raising of the limit of
the tax that could be levied by a county under certain conditions.
This amendment provided that, in addition to the tax authorized
for county purposes and that authorized for special road and
bridge purposes, it should be the duty of the county court when
authorized to do so by the majority of the qualified voters of a
road district, to make a levy of not to exceed 50c on the $100
valuation for the use of a road district. After the adoption of
this amendment in 1920, therefore, the maximum tax limit that
a county could levy for general purposes, for special road and
bridge purposes, and on behalf of a road district, had risen to
$1.25 on the $100 valuation. Thirteen years earlier this limit
was only 50c on the $100, it will be recalled.
In writing tax limits for city and town purposes, the framers
again attempted to introduce flexibility by classifying the various
municipalities and providing different tax limits for the cities
and towns of each class. The basis of their classification in this
case was not assessed valuation, which they had used for the
purpose in connection with tax limits for county purposes, but
instead was population. The reason for this shift in the basis
of classification is not known. It is likely that some light will
be shed on the question when the ninth and succeeding volumes
of the Debates of the Missouri Constitutional Convention of 1875
are published.
Article X, section 11 of the constitution provides the follow-
ing limits on the general property tax for city and town pur-
poses:
In cities and towns having a population of
80,000 inhabitants or more -------..........---------- $1.00 on the $100
In cities and towns having between 10,000 and
30,000 inhabitants -------------------.......---------------. 60 " "
In cities and towns having between 1,000 and
10,000 inhabitants ------------------------------- - -- ------- .50 " " .
In cities and towns having a population of 1,000
or less -----------...-------- .............- -- -------------------. 25 " " "
With one important exception (St. Louis), these constitutional
19421
Washington University Open Scholarship
378 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
limits on the tax rate for city and town purposes have not been
changed by amendment. Following the adoption of the Consti-
tution of 1875 came the separation of the City of St. Louis and
St. Louis County. The city thereupon found it necessary to
finance certain expenditures which are usually obligations of a
county, such as the expenses of judges, jurors, the sheriff, the
coroner, and others. Because no allowance had been made for a
change in the tax limit applicable to the City of St. Louis, hard-
ship soon developed. It resulted in an amendment to the consti-
tution in 1902 which authorized the City of St. Louis to levy for
municipal purposes, in addition to the rate permitted above, a
rate that would be allowed for "county purposes" if St. Louis
were part of a county. This had the effect of raising the limit
on the St. Louis city tax rate from $1.00 to $1.35 on the $100
of assessed valuation. Interestingly enough, the convention's
Committee on Revenue and Taxation recommended a limit of
80c in the rate for cities having a population of over 30,000
persons. 5
In the case of many cities, like that of the state, expenditures
have increased despite the limit placed on the property tax. These
additional expenditures have been financed by tax revenues from
new sources, such as a municipal tax on the sale of gasoline and
on the sale of cigarettes, by non-tax revenues, such as the fees
charged for municipal auto drivers' licenses, by the earnings of
municipal utilities, and the creation of floating debt to finance
over-spending.26
We have seen that nominal flexibility in the limits of tax rates
for county, and for city and town purposes, is provided by classi-
fying these units of government according to assessed valuation
in one case and population in the other, and then setting a limit
to the tax rate for each class. In the case of school districts,
15. Ibid.
16. Occasionally sufficient non-tax revenues will produce the phenomenon
euphemistically known as the "tax-free" town. The following item appears
in the February, 1942, Missouri Municipal Review: "West Plains to Be
Tax Free. James G. Harlin, 80-year-old mayor, who has held his post here
for 30 years, sees no reason why West Plains' 4,026 citizens should have
to pay any city taxes this year-and the two councilmen, Earle Armstrong
and Carrick Davidson, agree with him. Mr. A. H. Day, the efficient city
clerk and collector, reports that the city treasury now contains $47,000.
The city owns its own water and light plant, operates a stockyards, has
paid all its bills, paved its streets. In fact, said Mayor Harlin, 'We see no
reason why we can't get along without taxes for a good many years.' "
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however, flexibility in the tax rate limit is provided by a new
device. First, a constitutional tax limit is set. Then, it is pro-
vided that this limit may be exceeded upon condition that a cer-
tain type of referendum is favorable, but in no event can the rate
exceed a second constitutional tax limit.
The Constitution of 1875 (article X, section 11) sets a tax
rate limit of 60c on the $100 for school purposes in districts com-
posed of cities which have 100,000 inhabitants or more. In other
districts the limit is to be 40c on the $100. It is provided, how-
ever, that "on the condition that a majority of the voters who
are taxpayers, voting at an election held to decide the question,
vote for said increase" the rate can be increased to not to exceed
one dollar on the $100 "in districts formed of cities and towns,"
and in other districts to not to exceed 65c. The constitution also
provides that the constitutional tax rate limits may be exceeded
when the increase is for the purpose of erecting public buildings
in counties, cities, or school districts, and when the rate of in-
crease and the purpose for which it is intended shall have been
approved by two-thirds of the qualified voters of the govern-
mental unit voting at an election on the issue.
These provisions of the constitution relating to the tax rate
limit for school purposes have remained unchanged since 1875.
The hampering effect of this tax rate limit was circumvented in
the University City School District and, it is said, in many other
school districts, by the adroit use, or rather the failure to use,
the proceeds of the school building tax. This tax, of course, first
required the approval of a two-thirds majority of the electorate.
Following approval of the levy, the Board of Education of the
University City School District would then take care that much,
if not all, of this levy remained unspent at the end of the fiscal
year. The balance was then transferred to the general fund.
This practice was suddenly ended in University City when the
Circuit Court of St. Louis County, at the instance of four tax-
payers, invalidated the building fund levy and enjoined the
county clerk from extending it upon the tax books. The Missouri
Supreme Court upheld the circuit court.17
To provide relief in this situation, representative citizens and
the state legislators of St. Louis County united to have the legis-
17. Russell v. Frank (Mo. 1941) 154 S. W. (2d) 63.
19421
Washington University Open Scholarship
380 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
lature propose a constitutional amendment which will be voted
upon in November, 1942. Under the terms of this proposed
amendment, school districts in St. Louis County could vote an
additional general school tax of not to exceed one dollar on the
$100 if it is approved by a two-thirds majority of the voters
of the school district' 8
In summary, it may be said that when the framers of the Con-
stitution of 1875 wrote specific tax rate limits into that document,
their purpose undoubtedly was to prevent the increase of, if not
actually to reduce, governmental expenditures. By controlling
tax rate limits they were, by indirect means, trying to control
public expenditures. This was a most natural thing to do in
view of the fact that nearly all state and local revenues at that
time came from the general property tax. The framers probably
had the additional thought that a limited tax rate would prevent
wasteful public expenditures, and therefore promote wisdom in
public spending. When it is recalled that these Missourians were
blazing a new trail in the age-old field of the control of public
expenditures, it seems but proper to do them honor for the
thoughtfulness of their pioneer efforts.
The experience of the last 67 years with constitutional tax rate
limits in Missouri clearly shows their weaknesses. Tax rate limits
have not prevented the rise of public expenditures. The limits
have been circumvented in many ways: by the widespread use
of new forms of taxation (income tax, sales tax), by the creation
of new types of taxing units (road districts), by over-spending
and the creation of floating debt, by the creation of non-tax
revenues ("surplus" earnings of publicly owned enterprise), by
keeping assessed valuations above what may be called the "nor-
mal" ratio of assessed value to true value, and by subterfuge
(school building tax used for school operation purposes). When
circumvention appeared less attractive than amending the con-
stitution to raise the limit set therein on tax rates, the latter
course has been followed.
The argument that tax rate limits eliminate inefficiency and
waste in public expenditure generally fails because this device
is too crudely mechanical to affect instances of inefficiency. Cer-
tainly when a governmental unit levies a tax rate below the limit,
18. Mo. Laws of 1941, 721-722.
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or exists "tax-free," whatever waste there is in its public expen-
ditures continues despite the presence of a limit to the tax rate
in the constitution. These defects and shortcomings of limited
tax rates as a device for controlling public expenditures have been
observed in practice in many, many jurisdictions. For this rea-
son most students of public finance today are opposed to a limited
tax rate, and particularly to those written into a state constitu-
tion.1'9
If limits to the rate of the general property tax, set in con-
stitution or statute, have not proved themselves desirable for
many reasons, it is proper to ask what may be the best alterna-
tives known at present. One of the leading students of public
finance in this country, Mr. A. E. Buck, succinctly replies as
follows:
The methods which state governments should inaugurate
to assist local governments in rehabilitating their present
finances and in following thereafter a sound fiscal policy are
largely comprehended in financial planning and control.
They include comprehensive budgeting, up-to-date account-
ing, departmental costing, careful auditing, systematic re-
porting, personnel control, and centralized purchasing. These
methods have been applied, at least in part, to the local
governments of several states, hence they may not be re-
garded as new and untried devices. They enable local
authorities, experience has already shown, to exercise ef-
fective control over their finances, and they permit citizens
to approach intelligently the problems of local taxation.m 2
To these devices Professor Leland would add "centralized fiscal
supervision and even control. '21 He undoubtedly refers to fiscal
supervision and control of local government by a state adminis-
trative agency.
2. THE GENERAL PROPERTY TAX
The constitution of Missouri contains certain provisions which,
as interpreted by the state supreme court, require that all prop-
erty, with specified exemptions, be taxed in proportion to its
19. Groves, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 460-473; Jensen, Governme nt
Finance (1937) 267-270; and see Dykstra, Buck, Lutz, Groves, Reynolds,
Newcomer, Atkinson, Leland, and others in Public Administration Service,
Proper'ty Tax Limitation Laws (Rev. ed. 1936).
20. Public Administration Service, Property Tax Limitatio&n Laws (Rev.
ed. 1936) 14.
21. Id. at 88.
19421
Washington University Open Scholarship
882 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
value at a uniform rate of taxation. These provisions thus estab-
lish what is commonly called the "general property tax." They
prevent a classification of property for purposes of taxation.
From 1804 to 1865, taxes in Missouri were imposed upon such
specific subjects of taxation as were designated by the general
assembly and at such rates as it determined.2 2 The Constitution
of 1820 provided "that all property subject to taxation in this
State shall be taxed in proportion to its value." 2 Under this
provision, the general assembly was, however, still free to deter-
mine what property should be subject to taxation.
The Constitution of 1865 made a radical change in the tax
system of Missouri. It contained not only the provision "that all
property subject to taxation ought to be taxed in proportion to
value,"2 which was the same as that in the earlier constitution
except that it substituted the word "ought" for "shall," but there
was the further provision that "no property, real or personal,
shall be exempt from taxation, except such as may be used ex-
clusively for public schools and such as may belong to the United
States, to counties, and to municipal corporations within this
State."2 5 This marked the introduction of the general property
tax in Missouri.20
Article X, section 4 of the present Constitution of 1875 con-
tains the clause found in both of the earlier constitutions, that
"all property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to
its value." In article X, section 6, it provides that government
property and property of cemeteries shall be exempt from taxa-
tion, and that the general assembly "may" exempt "lots in incor-
porated cities or towns, or within one mile of the limits of any
such city or town, to the extent of one acre, and lots one mile
or more distant from such cities or towns, to the extent of five
acres, with the buildings thereon * * *, when the same are used
exclusively for religious worship, for schools, or for purposes
charitable; also, such property * * * as may be used exclusively
for agricultural or horticultural societies: Provided, That such
22. Judson, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 12-19.
23. Mo. Const. (1820) art. XIII, §19.
24. Mo. Const. (1865) art. I, §30. The state supreme court held that
the substitution of the word "ought" for "shall" was not material. Life
Association of America v. Board of Assessors (1872) 49 Mo. 512.
25. Mo. Const. (1865) art. XI, §16.
26. Note (1939).24 WASHINGTON U. LAw QUARTERLY 242, 251.
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exemptions shall be only by general law." Section 7 of article X
prohibits other exemptions.
An entirely new provision is found in article X, section 3,
which reads as follows: "Taxes may be levied and collected for
public purposes only. They shall be uniform upon the same class
of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying
the tax, and all taxes shall be levied and collected by the general
laws."
A state board of equalization, consisting of the governor, state
auditor, state treasurer, secretary of state, and attorney general,
is provided for in section 18 of article X. It is the duty of the
board "to adjust and equalize the valuation of real and personal
property among the several counties in the State."' 27
Missouri wrote the general property tax into its constitution
at a time when many other states were also repealing their dif-
ferential taxation measures. "The abolition of these early classi-
fication laws was due to the fact that many of the classifications
had become illogical and obsolete. The spread of the doctrine
of 'equality' was also a factor leading to the adoption of uniform
methods." 28 Although the abolition of the classified property tax
was generally considered a reform when the constitutions of
1865 and 1875 were adopted, it was not long before citizens of
the state became increasingly critical of the operation of the
general property tax. In 1900, a leading student of taxation in
Missouri wrote that "general property taxation * * * is ineffec-
tive and has resulted in inequalities and injustice. In respect to
intangible personal property, money, bonds, notes secured by
mortgages or otherwise, stock in non-resident companies * * *,
the experience of Missouri is in line with other states. The tax
is a confessed failure, admitted to be so by all. In fact, the failure
is so complete that it may be said the tax is practically repudi-
ated by the community. '29
Frequent reference is made in the messages of the governors
during the latter part of the nineteenth century to the failure
to reach intangible personal property. For example, in 1879
Governor Phelps called the attention of the general assembly to
27. From 1866 to 1875, the state board of equalization was composed of
the members of the state senate and the lieutenant governor and was on a
statutory basis. Mo. Laws of 1866, 126-127.
28. Leland, The Classified Pr-operty Tax in the United States (1928) 82.
29. Judson, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 245, 261, and 263.
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the evasion of taxes by money lenders, and to the small amount
of money returned for taxation, as compared with the amount of
loans shown by the county records.30 In 1900 the voters of Mis-
souri adopted a constitutional amendment which provided that
mortgages, deeds of trust, contracts or other obligations by which
a debt is secured shall, for the purposes of taxation, be deemed
an interest in the property affected, except as to railroad and
other quasi-public corporations, and that the owner of the mort-
gaged property shall be taxed on his equity in the property,
while the holder of the mortgage shall be taxed on the mortgage.31
The state supreme court invalidated this amendment on the
grounds that its discrimination against railroad and other quasi-
public corporations denied them the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution32 The amendment was repealed by another
amendment adopted in 1902.33
The general assembly undertook in 1917, when it enacted a
state income tax law, to classify property for the purpose of taxa-
tion and to tax certain intangibles at a low rate. The Secured
Debts Act of 191734 placed the following three types of property
in one class for purposes of taxation: (1) bonds, notes, deben-
tures, or obligations secured by collateral; (2) bonds, debentures,
or obligations not payable within one year from date of issue
and unsecured by collateral; and (3) bonds, notes, debentures,
or obligations issued by any state or political subdivision. A
recording tax, varying in amount in proportion to the face value
of the instruments evidencing these obligations and the period
of their maturity, was to be charged on them. They were exempt
from further taxation. This act was invalidated by the Missouri
Supreme Court in 1921. The court held in the case of State ex
rel. Tompkins v. Shipman 5 that article X, section 4 of the con-
stitution puts all property into a single class, and that this class
includes "not only real and personal property, but the divers
kinds of each. * * * When the constitution makes a single class,
the lawmaking power has no constitutional right to change or
30. Id. at 70-71.
31. Mo. Laws of 1905, 315.
32. Russell v. Croy (1901) 164 Mo. 69, 63 S. W. 849.
33. Mo. Laws of 1905, 317.
34. Mo. Laws of 1917, 539; R. S. Mo. (1919) c. 119, art. 20.
35. (1921) 210 Mo. 65, 234 S. W. 60.
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subdivide that class for the purpose of taxation, and this is what
the act undertakes to do.""86
Following the court decision of 1921, it was clear that the
general assembly could not classify property for purposes of
taxation under sections 3 and 4 of article X. The constitutional
convention of 1922-23 proposed that section 4 of article X be
amended to read as follows: "All property subject to taxation
shall be taxed in proportion to its value, or all kinds of property
subject to taxation may be classified by the general assembly for
the purpose of taxation. Each class may be taxed on such basis
of valuation or in such form as the general assembly may pro-
vide. The rate of taxation on each class shall be uniform."3'
This proposed amendment was defeated at the special election
of February 26, 1924, by a vote of 216,985 to 113,123.38
The Missouri Supreme Court, in its decision holding unconsti-
tutional the attempt of 1917 to classify property and to tax cer-
tain intangibles at a lower rate than other property, went be-
yond the legal questions involved and issued the following obiter
dictum:
The whole act is but a bungling attempt to exempt these
securities from the taxes that they should pay. But it is
urged that with this insignificant tax this class of prop-
erty will emerge from its hiding place, and the State will
be benefited thereby. If the penal laws were strengthened,
and then enforced, it would require but a few penitentiary
sentences to bring to light all such property for the payment
of taxes at the same rate as other property is required to
pay. The act is wrong in principle, and is against good
morals, and a fair sense of justice. All property should bear
its proportionate part of the State's necessities.39
Contrary to the opinion of the supreme court as expressed in
the decision of 1921, most students of taxation have condemned
the application of the general property tax to intangible personal
property (money, bonds, notes, mortgages, bank deposits, and
86. For a discussion of the uniformity clause of the constitution see
Note (1989) 24 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 242-256; Ely, Classifica-
tion of Property for Purposes of Taxation (1922) 23 Law Ser. Mo. Bull.
87-44.
87. Amendment No. 13 in Amendments to the Constitution of Missouri
Proposed by the Constitutional Convention of 1922-23 and the Address to
the People.
88. Mo. Laws of 1926, 408.
89. State ex rel. Tompkins v. Shipman (1921) 290 Mo. 65, 234 S. W. 60.
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corporate stock).4o They have concluded that the general prop-
erty tax as applied to intangibles is confiscatory in effect, that
it is unenforceable, and that an attempt to enforce the tax would
result in the falsification of the returns or the flight of intangibles
from the tax jurisdiction. A leading student of the property tax
in the United States, Professor Leland, declares that "the at-
tempted assessment of intangibles under the general property
tax has been a tale of continual failure, dating back almost to
colonial times."41
In a bulletin of the National Association of Assessing Officers,
it is stated that there are five major arguments against including
intangible property within the scope of the general property tax.
These arguments may be summarized as follows: (1) It is ex-
tremely difficult to find intangible property. (2) Interest and
dividend yields on intangibles have been adjusted to the expecta-
tion that such property will not be placed on the tax rolls, and
if the tax is imposed it takes a high proportion of the income.
(3) Under the customary rule of tax situs at the residence of
the owner, enforcement of the tax would tend to concentrate
intangibles in low rate "tax colonies." (4) Owners of intangi-
bles are generally thought to receive fewer direct benefits from
local government than owners of real and tangible personal prop-
erty. And (5) the taxation of intangibles involves double taxa-
tion, since intangible property has no value in and of itself, but
merely represents a legal claim upon tangible wealth which also
is taxed.42
The unfair nature of the general property tax as applied to
intangibles is apparent if one considers, for example, its appli-
cation to a government bond yielding one and one-half or two
per cent interest, or to money deposited in a bank account and
earning one and one-half per cent interest in the case of a say-
40. It should be noted that the Supreme Court of Missouri has held that
corporate stock is not subject to taxation under the general property tax
on the grounds that taxation of both the property and the stock of a
domestic corporation would result in double taxation, and that stock of a
foreign corporation does not represent property in this state. State ex rel.
Koeln v. Lesser (1911) 237 Mo. 310, 141 S. W. 888; State ex rel. Campbell
v. Brinkop (1911) 238 Mo. 298, 143 S. W. 444. See also Neuhoff, Missouri
Property Taxes and the Merchants' and Manufacturers' License (1929) 14
ST. Louis LAW REWmw 157-167.
41. Leland, op. cit. supra, note 28, at 27.
42. Property Taxation of Intangibles, Bulletin No. 21 of the National
Association of Assessing Officers, May 15, 1938, p. 1.
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ings account and no interest in the case of a checking account.
The holder of such intangibles in the City of St. Louis, where
the general property tax levy is $2.74 per $100 of assessed valu-
ation, would not only receive no income but would actually have
to pay for the privilege of owning the bond or maintaining the
bank account.
The objection that the general property tax results in double
taxation is well illustrated by the example of two identical and
adjoining farms, each of which is worth $10,000. One of the
farms is clear of debt. The second farm is encumbered with an
$8,000 mortgage. The total assessment on the first farm is
$10,000. The total assessment on the second farm is $18,000, for
under the general property tax both the farm and the mortgage
are assessed. Yet the value and the earning power of the two
pieces of property are equal.4 3
In practice most intangible property is not assessed, and con-
sequently it escapes taxation under the general property tax.
This is evident from the fact that the assessment of money, notes;
and bonds for the entire state of Missouri was $68,499,097 in
1891, but only $68,230,619 in 1939; while the assessment of real
estate increased from $629,024,442 in 1891 to $2,785,841,176 in
1939. 4 Thus there was a decrease in the assessment of intangible
property but more than a three-fold increase in that of real
estate during a period when the amount of intangible wealth in
Missouri actually increased at a much greater rate than did the
amount of real estate. The amount of intangible wealth now
assessed in the state is clearly only a small percentage of the
intangible wealth owned by its residents.
The difficulties encountered in attempting to apply the general
property tax to intangibles have led three-fourths of the states
to exempt intangibles from the property tax or to adopt a prop-
erty classification that grants intangibles some form of tax pref-
erence. The National Association of Assessing Officers reported,
in 1938, that only 12 states retain the general property tax.
Three states, it reported, exempt all intangibles, and six other
states exempt most intangibles, from any form of property tax
without subjecting them to any form of substitute tax. It re-
48. Groves, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 64.
44. Report of the State Auditor of Missouri (1891-92) 316; Jou7na of
the State Board of Equalization of Missouri (1940) 379.
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ported that seven states rely exclusively or chiefly upon a flat-
rate income tax to reach all or most intangibles. In some of these
instances the tax has been restricted to income from intangibles,
or such income has been subjected to heavier taxation than in-
come from other sources. In 16 states intangibles are subjected
to a low flat-rate on their capital value. Three states have adopted
a policy similar to that of the previous group, but differing in
that the preferential tax rate on intangibles varies with the tax
rate on other property. One state levies a flat-rate, non-recur-
ring tax on the capital value of intangibles.45 In 1939, Michigan
also abandoned the attempt to apply the general property tax to
intangibles.
In 1932 the National Tax Association, composed of tax officials,
scholars, lawyers, business men, and others interested in the solu-
tion of taxation problems, appointed a committee to revise the
Model System of State and Local Taxation, proposed by a com-
mittee of the association in 1918. The committee reported that
"nothing has occurred during the last fourteen years to modify
the conclusion of the former committee, that all attempts to reach
intangibles under the general property tax have proved failures."
It recommended that intangibles be exempted from the property
tax, but that they be subjected to a personal income tax. For
a state unwilling to introduce a personal income tax, the com-
mittee recommended the replacement of the property tax by a
flat-rate tax on intangibles. It stated that "it is well known that
in some of our states the so-called 'flat-tax on tangibles' has
improved materially the results achieved in the taxation of such
property." The committee was convinced "that in states which
are now limited by constitutional restrictions prescribing a uni-
form rule or method of taxation, no satisfactory adjustment of
tax problems can be reached until such limitations are removed,
or at least modified.
46
It is generally agreed among students of taxation that prop-
erty classification with lower tax rates applied to intangibles
45. Property Taxation of Intangibles, Bulletin No. 21 of the National
Association of Assessing Officers, May 15, 1938. In this bulletin each state
is classified according to its dominant policy.
46. National Tax Association, Second Report on a Plan of a Model Sys-
tem of State and Local Taxation (1933) 30, 31, 68. See also Model State
Constitution (4th ed. 1941) which omits any provisions restricting the power
of the legislature to classify property for purposes of taxation.
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than to other property results in an increased listing of intangi-
bles. Professor Leland believes that "the increased listing of
intangibles should be sufficient to prevent any loss in revenue
to the state resulting from the rate reductions, if accompanied
by reasonably efficient administration. ' 4 Professor Groves points
out that classification is not, however, a substitute "for the out-
right exemption of property, the inclusion of which cannot be
theoretically justified or for which no feasible means of suc-
cessful administration has been developed."4 8
In his report for 1939-40, State Auditor Forrest Smith calls
to the attention of the general assembly the fact that money,
notes, and bonds are not being reported to the assessor for pur-
poses of taxation. He suggests that the general assembly "give
proper consideration to proper legislation to include intangible
property for the purposes of taxation with a tax rate much
lower than the rate on real estate."' 9
3. DEBT LIMIT PROVISIONS
The Missouri Constitution of 1820, as originally drafted, con-
tained no provisions limiting the amount of public debt that
might be created. An amendment was adopted in 1859, however,
limiting the amount of state debt to 30 million dollars, except in
case of war, but no such provision appeared in the Constitution
of 1865.50 The purpose of public debt had been limited by pro-
visions in the Constitution of 1865 prohibiting the use of the
state's credit for any person, association, or corporation, and
prohibiting the legislature from authorizing any county, city,
or town to loan its credit to any company, association, or cor-
poration unless a two-thirds majority of the qualified voters gave
their approval.51
By way of contrast, one of the most prominent features of the
Constitution of 1875 was the restrictions placed on the amount
of public debt that might be created. The reason for this was,
of course, that it was felt that both state and local governments
had gone to extremes in issuing bonds to aid the railroads, and
this debt was most burdensome. Forty per cent of the expendi-
47. Leland, op. cit. supra, note 28, at 418.
48. Groves, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 100.
49. Report of the State Auditor (1939-40) 8.
50. Mo. Laws of 1858-59, 3.
51. Mo. Const. (1865) art. XI, §§13 and 14.
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tures of the state government in 1873-74 represented sums needed
to meet the interest on state debt.
Space does not permit an extensive treatment here of all the
constitutional provisions with respect to public debt, and the
manner in which the courts have interpreted these provisions.
Therefore, only some of the more important will be discussed.
The principal restrictions upon the amount of the debt that
may be created for state purposes are to be found in article IV,
section 44 of the Constitution of 1875. This provides that the
legislature shall have no power to contract a debt or liability
except (1) in renewal of existing bonds when they cannot be
paid at maturity, (2) in the case of an unforeseen emergency or
casual deficiency of the revenue when the temporary liability in-
curred shall not exceed $250,000 for any one year, with the
recommendation of the governor, and to be repaid in not more
than two years, and (3) in the case of any unforeseen emergency,
or casual deficiency of the revenue when the temporary liability
shall exceed $250,000, and the matter is ratified by a two-thirds
majority vote at an election held for that purpose.
If it was the intention of the framers that all future state
debts of over $250,000 must first be authorized by a two-thirds
majority of the state electorate, Missouri's recent history would
prove a great disappointment. Since 1875 state bonds totaling
$169,100,000 have been authorized by popular vote. Of this total
only $3,500,000 was submitted and approved under the consti-
tutional provision requiring a two-thirds majority vote. The
remaining $165,000,000 was submitted and approved in the form
of amendments to the constitution, which require only a simple
majority for approval, and only $15,000,000 of these bonds re-
ceived as much as a two-thirds majority vote.
A reading of the Debates of the Missouri Constitutional Con-
vention of 1875 on this point fails to indicate that the framers
thought of the possibility of the circumvention of the two-thirds
majority requirement by the expedient of authorizing a large
bond issue in an amendment to the constitution.52 As evidence
of the way the delegates were thinking, it may be said that some
of them favored restricting the franchise on issues involving the
taxing power to "taxpayers" or "taxpayers who are qualified
52. 7 Debates of the Missouri Constitutional Convention of 1875, 326-353,
368-377.
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voters." In answer to this it was pointed out several times that
the provision was amply conservative because of the inclusion
of the requirement that a two-thirds majority was necessary for
the approval of a proposed large bond issue.5 3
The only bond issue in Missouri history that was submitted
for, and received, the constitutional two-thirds majority was that
authorizing $3,500,000 to build the present state capitol to re-
place the one destroyed by fire.54 The soldiers' bonus bond issue
of $15,000,000, approved August 2, 1921, actually received more
than a two-thirds majority, although it was submitted as a con-
stitutional amendment and needed only a simple majority for
passage.55
The general limitations on the debt that may be assumed by
the political subdivisions of the state are to be found in article
X, section 12 of the constitution. Here it is provided that no
county, city, town, township, school district, or other political
corporation of the state shall become indebted for any purpose
to an amount exceeding in any year the income and revenue pro-
vided for that year without the consent of a two-thirds majority
of the voters casting ballots on the proposition. The constitution
requires that before or at the time of securing the consent of
the voters, provision be made for the collection of an annual tax
sufficient to pay interest on the debt and constitute a sinking
fund to repay the principal within 20 years. The proposed and
the existing debt must not exceed five per cent of the assessed
valuation as determined by the assessment for state and county
purposes, previous to the incurring of the new indebtedness. The
very conservative nature of the last requirement has been re-
laxed, however, for certain corporations and certain types of
debt, as follows:
1. Cities having a population of 75,000 or more may become
indebted, with the approval of the two-thirds majority as de-
fined, to an amount not exceeding 10% of the assessed value.
2. Counties, with the approval of the two-thirds majority as
defined, may become indebted to an amount in excess of five per
53. Ibid. See comments of Alexander, Farris, Fyan, and Halliburton,
384, 337, 346-348.
54. Mo. Laws of 1911, 250-254, 416-417; Official Manual of the State of
Missouri (1911-12) 832-833.
55. Official Manual of the State of Missouri (1921-22) 479.
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cent for the erection of a courthouse or jail or for the grading,
construction, paving, or maintaining of paved, graveled, mac-
adamized or rock roads, and necessary bridges and culverts.
3. Cities having a population of 75,000 or more may issue
public utilities bonds, for the purchase or construction of certain
utilities, which are not to be included in the debt heretofore
limited, but such debt is not to exceed in amount 20% of the
assessed valuation of the city. Such bonds are not to be issued
without the assent of four-sevenths of the voters voting on the
question of issuing such bonds. The principal of the public utili-
ties bonds is not to be a general obligation of the city payable
from tax revenues.
4. The constitution was amended in 1920 in order that cities
of not over 30,000 population might exceed the constitutional
debt limits heretofore mentioned. This was to be permitted, with
the assent of two-thirds of the voters, when bonds were to be
issued to finance the purchase or construction of water works,
ice plants, and electric or other light plants, but the debt for
this purpose was not to exceed an additional 10% of the assessed
valuation.
The provisions cited above should be sufficient to illustrate the
type of constitutional debt limits that prevail in Missouri and
the attempts that have been made to inject some flexibility to
meet local needs into a device that compels quite rigid control
even at best.
Limitations of space will not permit us to develop here the
interpretations the courts have made of these debt limits. It
must suffice to say that the courts have held that bonds of local
benefit districts issued against special assessments are not "in-
debtness," nor are the bonds issued under an act creating sever
districts in counties containing 75,000 inhabitants or more. 0
Perhaps enough has been said of this complicated situation
to indicate the difficulties experienced in Missouri in attempting
a wise regulation of the amount and character of public debt
through arbitrary constitutional debt limits. The shortcomings
of this device have been well stated as follows:
State efforts to control local borrowing by imposing fixed
limits based on a percentage of assessed valuation have been
a partial failure for several reasons. In some states the per-
56. State ex rel. Gentry v. Curtis (1928) 319 Mo. 316, 4 S. W. (2d) 467.
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centage has been set too high. In the great majority a pyra-
miding of limits is possible because of overlapping govern-
mental units. A really restrictive percentage tends to en-
courage evasion by the creation of special districts with
separate and additional borrowing powers. In the several
instances in which special assessment bonds are not included
in the debt limit, even when they are contingent obligations
of the municipality, the sky is the limit for public improve-
ment borrowing. The existence of this loophole has had a
particularly disastrous effect in Florida, North Carolina,
Ohio and New Jersey. The customary practice of applying
the borrowing ratio to a single year's assessed valuation,
moreover, has been an unfavorable factor. Not only has it
stimulated inflation by encouraging borrowing against ris-
ing and speculative valuations, but it has sometimes re-
sulted in the connivance of unscrupulous officials, land specu-
lators and bond dealers to produce fictitious valuations as a
basis for excessive bond issues.57
In view of this criticism it is fitting to ask what is considered
to be a superior device for the wise control of public debt. Dr.
Bird recommends: "First of all, the citizens of each community
should be put in possession of certain basic information regard-
ing the true size of the local indebtedness, direct and overlapping,
the relation of this debt to taxpaying capacity, and the size of the
indebtedness of other communities of comparable population and
wealth."5 8
Professor Groves believes that "By all odds the most construc-
tive and promising innovation in state control is the North Caro-
lina Local Government Commission, which has been in operation
since 1931. The work of the Commission is divided into four
parts: approval of applications for local bond and note issues,
approval of refunding and readjusting operations, supervision
of sinking funds, and auditing reports from municipalities."59
4. PowERs AND PROcEDURES OF STATE FINANCE OFFICERS
The Constitution of 1820 made provision for two state finance
officers. It provided for a state auditor to be appointed by the
governor, "by and with the advice and consent of the senate,"
57. Frederick L. Bird in Studenski, Taxation and Public Policy (1936)
128. Dr. Bird is Director of Municipal Research for Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
58. Id. at 123.
59. Groves, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 682. See also Ratchford, The Work
of the North Carolina Local Government Commission (1936) 25 National
Municipal Rev. 323.
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and a state treasurer to be chosen by a joint vote of the two
houses of the general assembly.60 In 1851 an amendment was
adopted introducing elective tenure in both of these offices.0 1
Under the Constitution of 1865, the state auditor and the state
treasurer were continued as elective officers.62 The present Con-
stitution of 1875 provides for a state auditor and a state trea-
surer to be elected for terms of four years, the latter being in-
eligible for reelection as his own successor.0 3 Provision is also
made for an ex officio state board of equalization whose duties
are financial. The membership and duties of this board have been
described above.64 The governor, although not a "finance" officer,
is given important duties relative to fiscal management.
The constitution does not enumerate the duties of the state
auditor. Aside from the provision that he shall draw warrants
for the disbursement of moneys in the state treasury, it merely
provides that he "shall perform such duties as may be prescribed
by law."65 His duties, as prescribed by law, relate to accounting,
auditing, collection of taxes, and supervision of local government.
As "general accountant" of the state government, it is the duty
of the state auditor to keep all state accounting records and docu-
ments not required by law to be kept by any other person; to
audit, adjust, and settle all claims against the state treasury,
except such claims as are required by law to be audited and
settled by other persons; to draw all warrants upon the state
treasury, except in cases otherwise provided by law; to audit,
settle, and adjust the accounts of collectors of the revenue and
other persons holding money required by law to be paid into
the state treasury; to prescribe a complete system of accounting
and reporting for each state office and institution; and to pre-
-pare periodic fiscal reports for the general assembly, the gover-
mor, and the general public.6
It is the duty of the state auditor "at least once every two
years * :* * to visit, examine, inspect and audit the accounts of
the various institutions of the state * * *, all other institutions
60. Mo. Const. (1820) art. III, §31, art. IV, §12.
61. Mo. Laws of 1850-51, 47, 48.
62. Mo. Const. (1865) art. V, §16.
63. Mo. Const. (1875) art. V, §§1 and 2.
64. See note 27, supra.
65. Mo. Const. (1875) art. V, §1, art. X, §15.
,66. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§13021, 13022, 13026, 13095.
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supported in whole or in part by the state, and such other
officers of the state as receive their appointment from any elec-
tive officer."6 7 Such an audit is commonly termed a "post-audit,"
for it takes place after the completion of the financial trans-
actions audited. It is distinguished from the "pre-audit," which
is the examination of financial transactions prior to their com-
pletion and is thus essentially a part of the day-to-day account-
ing process.
The state auditor's office is one of the chief tax collecting
agencies of the state. The state auditor is charged by law with
the responsibility of administering the state sales tax. It is his
duty to supervise the work of local officers in the assessment and
collection of the state income tax and to audit taxpayers' accounts
and returns. He also assesses and collects the gross receipts tax
on express companies.68 Finally, the state auditor has come to
be the local government agent of the state. The statutes provide
that he shall prescribe a complete accounting and reporting sys-
tem in each of the 110 counties that do not have a county auditor
or comptroller. It is also his duty to make periodic audits of the
accounts in each of these same counties. He prescribes budget
forms for the 109 counties with populations of 50,000 or less,
aids these counties in the preparation of their budgets, and re-
ceives copies of them after they are finally adopted. Each of
the 114 counties must file a copy of its annual financial statement
with the state auditor. Bonds of a county, township, city, town,
village, school district, or special road district are not valid and
may not be negotiated until they are registered in the office of
the state auditor, who must certify that the bonds are issued in
compliance with the laws.69
Although it is common in state governments for the office of
state auditor to exercise the functions of both accounting and
post-auditing, most students of financial administration have
concluded that these functions should be completely separated.
One of the leading writers on this subject, Mr. A. E. Buck, has
analyzed the problem in the following terms:
There seems to be a lack of appreciation of the character
and advantages of an independent audit in state govern-
67. R. S. Mo. (1939) §13094.
68. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§11294, 11343-11377, 11407-11456.
69. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§3306, 10910-10917, 13094, 13095, 13828.
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ments. Such an audit is presumed to be a function of the
state auditor (sometimes designated comptroller), who in
most states is an elective official. But this official usually
exercises financial control functions to the exclusion of post-
auditing, that is, he keeps general accounts, supervises de-
partmental accounting, and settles claims for and against
the state government. Ordinarily his control functions so
involve him in the fiscal operations of the government that
any post-audit which he may attempt is practically useless,
since it means a critical examination of his own decisions
and accounting entries.
A complete separation of the functions of financial control
and accounting from those of independent auditing (post-
auditing) and review is necessary in order to obtain the
most satisfactory results. The control and accounting func-
tions are executive in character and therefore belong to an
officer-a controller-directly responsible to the governor.
Such functions are part and parcel of the system of budget-
ing and financial management by which the governor is en-
abled to control the state's business operations. To remove
them from the governor by placing them under an inde-
pendent officer is to hamstring his control over the state
administration. On the other hand, the functions of post-
audit and review belong to the legislature. They are implied
in the powers of the legislature to appropriate money to the
executive and the administrative departments to carry on
the activities of the state government. They are the means
of enforcing financial accountability upon the governor and
his departmental heads. * * * Power and authority com-
mensurate with full responsibility for all administrative
operations may be accorded the governor as long as the
legislature brings him to complete accountability for his
acts. 0
Dr. W. F. Willoughby has analyzed the problem along similar
lines, and he points out that the separation of the functions of
accounting and post-audit "represents only the carrying into the
system of public administration of the almost universal practice
on the part of private corporations." 1
In this connection it is interesting to note that the Model State
Constitution provides that the legislature shall appoint an auditor
to serve at its pleasure. It is the duty of such auditor to "con-
70. Buck, The Reorganization of State Governments in the United States
(1938) 23-24.
71. The Offices of the Comptroller and Auditor (1932) 14 Public Manage-
ment 83. See also Porter, State Administration (1938) 125-127.
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duct post-audits of all transactions and of all accounts kept by
or for all departments, offices and agencies of the state govern-
ment, to certify to the accuracy of all financial statements issued
by accounting officers of the state, and to report his findings and
criticisms to the governor and to a special committee of the legis-
lature quarterly, and to the legislature at the end of each fiscal
year. He shall also make such additional reports to the legisla-
ture and the proper legislative committee, and conduct such in-
vestigation of the financial affairs of the state, or of any depart-
ment, office or agency thereof, as either of such bodies may re-
quire."72
As in the case of the state auditor, the constitution provides
that the state treasurer "shall perform such duties as may be
prescribed by law." It also indicates the nature of these duties
by providing that the state treasurer shall deposit all moneys in
the state treasury in such banks as he may select with the ap-
proval of the governor and attorney-general, and such moneys
"shall be disbursed by said treasurer for the purposes of the
state, according to the law, upon warrants drawn by the state
auditor, and not otherwise." 3 In addition to these constitutional
duties, the general assembly has charged the state treasurer with
the collection of the state inheritance, corporation franchise, and
private car taxes.-
The prime function of a treasurer is the custody of funds.
Professor Porter expresses the opinion of most students of finan-
cial administration, when he declares that "the work of collec-
tion * * * is not proper work for a treasurer. * * * Burdening
treasurers with responsibility for enforcing collections has al-
ways been to effect a bad combination of functions."7 5
At the present time, the 14 major taxes of the Missouri state
government are assessed and collected by 10 state agencies, in
addition to the five local government agencies that participate in
the process. In no other state is tax collection so decentralized.78
Tax authorities generally agree that the centralization of the tax
collection function in one office results in increased collections
72. Model State Constitution (4th ed. 1941) §707.
73. Mo. Const. (1875) art. V, §1, art. X, §§15, 16.
74. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§580, 599, 600, 5115, 11287, 13047.
75. Porter, op. cit. supra, note 71, at 101, 102.
76. 4 Federation of Tax Administrators, Tax Administrators News
(1940) No. 12, p. 97.
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and lowered costs. 77 This conclusion follows from the many ad-
vantages of centralized tax collection. They may be summarized
briefly as follows:
1) Increased opportunity to reduce costs by leveling off peak
loads and securing the maximum year-around production
from the permanent personnel and machine equipment avail-
able.
2) Reduction in unit costs by the application of more efficient
methods to a larger volume of work.
3) A tendency to develop executives interested in one thing-im-
proved administration of tax collection.
4) The development of adequately trained specialists under these
executives.
5) Improvement of the entire state tax system because of the
possibility of seeing the whole problem and bringing profes-
sional and expert ability to its solution.
6) Centralization of administrative responsibility for efficient
tax collection administration.
7) Added convenience to the taxpayer because of a reduction in
the number of state tax agencies with which he deals.
8) A tendency to decrease opportunities for tax evasion, by us-
ing information filed on one tax return for auditing another
filed by the same taxpayer.
In his inaugural address of February 26, 1941, Governor For-
rest C. Donnell recommended "that there be enacted legislation
to create a Consolidated State Revenue Department," and pointed
out that many advantages would accrue from such legislation.
Former-Governor Lloyd C. Stark also urged the centralization
of tax collection. In a message to the general assembly, on Janu-
ary 15, 1941, he suggested that "a central tax-collecting agency
would certainly result in more efficient collection of tax monies
and would bring about a marked reduction in the payrolls of
various departments now engaged in this function." The gen-
eral assembly has not yet acted on these recommendations.
The framers of the present constitution recognized the neces-
sity for executive leadership in the field of state finance. They
provided that the governor should present at the commencement
of each regular session of the general assembly "estimates of the
amount of money required to be raised by taxation for all pur-
77. Graves, Administration of State Taxes as Viewed by an Adminis-
trator (1936) 183 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Sciences 189-190; Howard, Principles of Public Finance (1940) 431-432;
Groves, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 722.,
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poses." They also required all officers of the executive depart-
ment to keep an account of all moneys and choses in action dis-
bursed or otherwise disposed of by them, to make a semi-annual
report thereof to the governor, and to make special reports at
the latter's request. Finally, they provided that if "any bill pre-
sented to the Governor contains several items of appropriation
of money, he may object to one or more items while approving
other portions of the bill." 78
In 1932 the voters amended the constitution to express even
more clearly their conviction that a business carrying on so many
activities and spending so much money as the Missouri state
government could be managed efficiently only by vesting respon-
sibility for fiscal management in the chief executive. The amend-
ment adopted in 1932 provides that the governor "shall, not later
than fifteen days after the convening of the General Assembly
in each biennial session, submit a budget showing estimated avail-
able revenues of the state for the ensuing biennium and recom-
mending a complete plan of expenditures. All recommended ex-
penditures and appropriations shall be itemized." The governor
is also empowered to veto "portions of items" in appropriation
bills, but he may not "reduce" any appropriation for free public
school purposes.79
Due to the fact that the state's fiscal biennium begins on Janu-
ary 1 and that the general assembly does not meet until the first
Wednesday after this date, the governor's budget is not presented
to the general assembly until after the fiscal period has begun,
and several more months elapse before the budget is finally
adopted. This means the state's business must be carried on
during these months without a budget. Departmental operations
have at times been seriously hampered.
The federal government, most states, and many units of local
government have adopted a fiscal period beginning on July 1.
The fiscal operations of the Missouri state government would be
greatly facilitated by the adoption of such a fiscal period. To
make this change, it would probably be necessary to amend the
state constitution, because of the present provision that a pay-
ment of money from the state treasury must be made, or a war-
78. Mo. Const. (1875) art. V, §§10, 13, 22.
79. Mo. Const. (1875) art. V, §13; Official Manua of the State of Mis-
souri (1983-34) 397.
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rant issued therefor, within two years after the passage of the
appropriation act authorizing the payment.8 0 If the suggested
fiscal period were adopted without changing this provision of the
constitution, all appropriation bills would have to be passed on
or after July 1.
At the same time, it would be well to amend the constitution
to permit the governor to present his proposed budget to the
general assembly at a later date, say March 15. The governor
takes office on the second Monday of January, and this change
would give him ample time to make his appointments and to
acquaint himself with the financial needs of the state before he
undertook to formulate his budget. It would also enable the
general assembly to organize and take care of general legisla-
tion prior to March 15, after which it could concentrate its at-
tention on the budget until it was adopted.
It would also be well to incorporate into the constitution a
provision somewhat like the following provision of the Model
State Constitution: "At the time of submitting the budget to the
legislature, the governor shall introduce therein a-general appro-
priation bill to authorize all the proposed expenditures set forth
in the budget. At the same time he shall introduce in the legis-
lature a bill or bills covering all recommendations in the budget
for new or additional revenues or for borrowing by which the
proposed expenditures are to be met."8'
Such a procedure would give the general assembly something
definite to work upon, and would make it treat the governor's
budget as more than an administrative report. It would also
enable the governor to present the expenditure plan in one bill,
itemized to whatever degree he may think necessary for good
administration and with such terms and conditions attached as
may be required to control expenditures.
5. MISCELLANEOUS FINANCIAL PROVISIONS
Many provisions of the Constitution of 1875 reflect the un-
favorable experiences of the framers with state and local sub-
sidies to railroads during the period of 1851 to 1865. Most
directly reflecting these experiences are those provisions pro-
hibiting public aid to any corporation or individual.
80. Mo. Const. (1875) art. X, §19.
81. Model State Constitution (4th ed. 1941) §703.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss3/1
FINANCE, DEBT, AND TAXATION
The Constitution of 1865 had forbidden the state to extend
its credit "in aid of any person, association or corporation," or
to become a stockholder in any corporation or association, except
to secure "loans heretofore extended to certain railroads by the
State." The general assembly was also forbidden to authorize
any county, city, or town to become a stockholder in, or to loan
its credit to any company, association, or corporation, without
the consent of two-thirds of the qualified voters of such county,
city, or town.
2
Under the present constitution, the prohibitions against public
grants to individuals and corporations are strengthened, but a
proviso is added to permit public aid in case of public calamity.
Article IV, section 46 provides that "The General Assembly shall
have no power to make any grant, or to authorize the making
of any grant of public money or thing of value to any individual,
association of individuals, municipal or other corporation what-
soever: Provided, That this shall not be so construed as to pre-
vent the grant of aid in a case of public calamity."
Article IV, section 47 forbids the general assembly to author-
ize any subdivision of the state to "lend its credit, or to grant
public money or thing of value in aid of or to any individual,
association or corporation, or to become a stockholder in such
corporation, association or company."
Article IV, section 49 contains the clause found in the earlier
constitution, forbidding the state to become a stockholder in any
corporation or association.
Beginning in 1892 a series of amendments have been adopted
authorizing public aid to particular groups of individuals. These
amendments authorize the payment of public money for pensions
to members of municipal fire or police departments and their
widows or dependent children; retirement, disability, or death
benefits to persons paid out of any public fund for educational
services, or to their beneficiaries or estates; pensions to the de-
serving blind; and pensions or assistance to persons over 65
years of age, "who are incapacitated from earning a livelihood
and are without means of support. '8
3
In view of the broad prohibition contained in article IV, sec-
82. Mo. Const. (1865) art. XI, §§13, 14.
83. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IV, §§47, 47a, 48a.
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tion 46 of the constitution against public grants to any indi-
vidual, the question has frequently been raised whether or not
appropriations for poor relief are constitutional. It has been
argued by some persons that such appropriations are constitu-
tional during an economic depression as a "grant of aid in case
of public calamity." On such grounds alone, they would not be
constitutional after the economic depression is ended. This ques-
tion has not been put directly to the state supreme court.
It has been held in most states that constitutional restrictions
such as those found in article IV, section 46 of the Missouri con-
stitution do not apply to appropriation statutes where (1) the
grant is to pay a moral obligation of the state, (2) it is for a
public purpose, or (3) it is to carry out a governmental func-
tion.4 The Supreme Court of Missouri has applied the "public
purpose" test to appropriations. For example, a St. Louis city
ordinance authorizing the issuance of bonds to provide for poor
relief was upheld as being for a public purpose.8 In another
case, a statute granting a telephone company the right to build
lines along, under, and over state highways was upheld on the
same grounds.8 6
After considering article IV, section 46 in the light of its
history and purpose and applying the legal tests commonly used
to ascertain the scope of such sections, one writer concludes that
the "section is found not to have been intended to prohibit direct
poor relief. An appropriation for poor relief would be constitu-
tional regardless of the existence of a public calamity; but if an
economic depression and widespread unemployment be found to
be a public calamity, poor relief can be brought within the
proviso and sustained on that ground.187
One other financial provision of the constitution should be
mentioned here. Article XI section 7 provides that there shall
be set apart not less than "twenty-five per cent of the State
revenue, exclusive of the interest and sinking fund, to be applied
annually to the support of the public schools." Beginning in
84. Note, Constitutionality of Appropriations for Poor Relief in Missouri
(1940) 25 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 267-268.
85. Jennings v. City of St. Louis (1933) 332 Mo. 173, 58 S. W. (2d) 979.
86. State ex inf. McKittrick v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. (1936) 338
Mo. 617, 92 S. W. (2d) 612.
87. Note, Constitutionality of Appropriations for Poor Relief in Missouri
(1940) 25 WASHINGTON U. LAW QuARTELY 267, 278.
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1887, the general assembly has followed the practice of appro-
priating one-third of these receipts for this purpose. Aside from
the question of whether state disbursements for public schools
have been too large or too small, the practice of setting aside a
fixed percentage of receipts for any particular purpose is open
to serious criticism. It tends to induce the general assembly to
set aside the same percentage each biennium without giving thor-
ough consideration to the exact amount of money thus appro-
priated, to the needs of the particular department or service, or
to the relative needs of other departments or services competing
for public funds. Even if all of these factors are thoroughly con-
sidered by the general assembly, such a practice does not permit
adequate budgetary control. For example, at the time of making
an appropriation of one-third of the ordinary revenues for public
schools, the general assembly may estimate that such receipts
will total $90,000,000, thus making an appropriation of $30,000,-
000 for public schools. The receipts may actually amount to
$115,000,000. In this case, the public schools receive $35,000,000
of state money, or $5,000,000 more than the members of the gen-
eral assembly thought that they were authorizing.
6. CONCLUSION
The financial, debt, and taxation provisions of the Constitution
reflect the sincere desire of the framers to find an answer to the
problems of increasing governmental expenditures, debts, and
taxes. In 1875 the property tax was the only important source
of state and local revenue, and the framers provided a specific
limit to the rate that could be imposed by each class of govern-
mental unit for general purposes. They sought to guarantee an
equitable tax system by requiring that all property not exempted
by the terms of the constitution be taxed in proportion to value
and at the same rate. Detailed restrictions were placed on the
amount of public debt that could be incurred. Grants of public
money to individuals or corporations were forbidden, except in
a case of public calamity. Certain state finance officers were pro-
vided for, but their duties were not clearly defined.
Analysis of these provisions has indicated that the objectives
of the framers have been realized only in small measure. In-
creased demands for governmental services have led to the ex-
ploitation of new sources of revenue. Some of the restrictions
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have been circumvented. In other cases limits imposed have been
modified by constitutional amendment to make them less restric-
tive. Many further changes need to be adopted to make the
financial, debt, and tax provisions of the constitution conform
to present-day needs for governmental services, yet conserving
the principles of economy in public expenditures and equity in
taxation.
Experience has clearly indicated that wasteful expenditures
and burdensome or inequitable taxes cannot be prevented by
detailed, restrictive, constitutional provisions. There is no sub-
stitute for wise legislation and efficient administration. These
can be achieved only by a citizenry that is constantly informed
and alert.
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